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Selective Production of Exotic Species is an innovative plant for advanced nuclear physic studies. A
radioactive beam, generated by using an UCx target-ion source system, is ionized, selected and accel-
erated for experimental objects. Very high vacuum conditions and appropriate safety systems to storage
exhaust gases are required to avoid radiological risk for operators and people. In this paper, Failure Mode,
Effects, and Criticality Analysis of a preliminary design of high activity gas recovery system is performed
by using a modified Fuzzy Risk Priority Number to rank the most critical components in terms of failures
and human errors. Comparisons between fuzzy approach and classic application allow to show that
Fuzzy Risk Priority Number is able to enhance the focus of risk assessments and to improve the safety of
complex and innovative systems such as those under consideration.
© 2020 Korean Nuclear Society, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Selective Production of Exotic Species (SPES) project [1e3] is a
facility designed by Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN),
Laboratori Nationali di Legnaro, Italy, with two main goals:
 provide an accelerator system to perform forefront research in
nuclear physics and astrophysics by studying nuclei far from
stability
 develop an accelerator based interdisciplinary research centre.
The activities will allow to improve knowledge on production of
radionuclides of medical interest or, more generally, to investigate
materials for future nuclear reactors.
The major differences of SPES with respect to similar plants is
the production of neutron-rich radioactive nuclei with mass in the
range 80e160 b y using protons that induce fissions on a direct
target of Uranium Carbide (UCx) at a rate of 1013 fission/s [4e7].
Attention to neutron-rich isotopes is justified by the fact that
this vast territory has been little explored, at exceptions of some
decay and in beam spectroscopy following fission.iardina).
by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is anEach experiment will run through a long period of time in order
to determine good characteristic of radioactive beams used for
experimental purposes. This implies that the exhaust gases of the
vacuum system should be filtered and stored safely in an appro-
priate system called high activity gas recovery system (HA-GRS).
It should be noted that radioactive gases produced in SPES target
are b and g emitters and direct discharge of this gas mixture into
the atmosphere isn’t allowed due to radiation risks for the
environment.
After a sufficient storage time (various months), nuclear decay
events reduce the concentration of the emitters, so it becomes
possible to release gas to the chimney in a controlled way. Design of
HA-GRS should ensure to manage different and complex opera-
tional steps, where high levels of safety are required.
Currently, the safety team is involved in research activities of
HA-GRS devices that are suitable for use in safety instrumented
functions (SIF) [8]. The main aim is to define a detailed design,
foreseen at the end of this year. The last stages are installation and
commissioning of the whole system.
In this field, failure mode effect and criticality analysis (FMECA)
is a powerful tool to identify potential failures of components and
to assess the risk associated with failure modes.
FMECA determines the critical ranking of failure modes using
the risk priority numbers (RPN) as product of evaluation criteria
like occurrence (O), detection (D), severity (S). Parameter Oopen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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the probability to detect the failure mode before it happens; S
measures the severity of consequences of failure mode.
RPN method may not be realistic in some applications [9].
Moreover, precise ranking values of O, S and D are often difficult to
elicit from the experts which may prefer linguistic-valued judg-
ments rather than quantitative ones [10,11]. Finally, equal impor-
tance attributed to these parameters could lead to inaccurate risk
ranking of failure modes [11].
In addition, in case of experimental facility or, more generally,
complex systems, a critical aspect to identify risks associated to
multiple operational steps is related to extensive use of one-of-a-
kind devices for which experiences in failure modes and reli-
ability data collections are limited. Consequently, it is a mandatory
step for the safety analyst resorting to more than one expert
judgement.
As a response to these issues, it is proposed to use fuzzy risk
priority number (FRPN) [11], modified by employing the Evidence
Theory [12] in construction of weights for linguistic classifications
of O, S and D and in assignment of relative importance among these
parameters. The aim is to reduce the uncertainty that exists among
multiple alternatives elicited from various opinions [13e16].
Methodologies to determine the weight of risk factors mainly
include the subjective weighting method, the objective weighting
method, and the comprehensive weighting method [17]. However,
the proposed approach allows to take into account interpretative
processes performed by experts on data related to risk assessments
of failure modes and, at the same time, to give consideration to a
number of deficiencies in conventional RPN calculation highlighted
in literature [9e11,18e24]. This is performed both for component
failures and human error.
By using this tool, two main operating conditions of HA-GRS
have been examined: storage operation and discharge operation.
FMECA analyses of maintenance procedures are also addressed to
identify HA-GRS malfunctions due to operator errors (human
factor).
Critical analysis of the results has allowed to provide recom-
mendations able to improve safety requirements for equipment
and procedures, reducing the occurrence of accidental conditions.
These suggestions will be used in revised design of HA-GRS system.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes fuzzy RPN
approach in FMECA, evidence theory application in FRPN tool and
improvements proposed for elicitation procedure used to refine
failure modes ranking, both for component failures and human
factor. A numerical example is shown. Section 3 introduces
description of HA-GRS system and results of FRPN analysis. Section
4 reports our conclusions.
2. Use of FRPN in FMECA and evidence theory application
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [17] and FMECA
[18e20] are methodologies designed to identify potential failure
modes of components, assess risks associated with those failure
modes, rank the issues in terms of importance and, finally, carry out
corrective actions to address the most significant issues.
In this methodology, widely used in numerous industrial ap-
plications [17e24], index RPN permits to rank the importance of
each failure by using the product of three ratings:
RPN ¼ O x D x S (1)
where, O, D, and S, measured on a 10-point scale (high value means
more critical risk), are: O is related to the occurrence frequency of
the component failure mode, D is the probability of not detecting
this failure, and S is the level of damage that it can do on the system,1465process and the environment.
Despite its wide use, traditional RPN has been criticized due to
various shortcomings [9e11,20,22,24] such as: risk factors O, D, and
S are difficult to be precisely evaluated; different evaluation of O, S
and D may lead to identical RPN even if there are different risk
implications; the methodology is unable to properly deal with
human errors.
To improve traditional FMECA application, a fuzzy logic meth-
odology of RPN (i.e. FRPN) is proposed in Ref. [11] to address the
following issues: provide a linguistic support to experts that must
give three values for the risk factors; consider human errors in
FMECA; and solve the issue that different O, D, and S combinations
lead to same RPN value.
The methodology infers fuzzy conclusions from fuzzy facts by
using the following steps [11]:
 O, S, and D, used as inputs, and FRPN, used as output, are clas-
sified into fuzzy linguistic distributions (e.g. Very Low, Low,
Moderate, …), by using triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy sets. A
weight is attributed to each linguistic variable by assuming
linear hypothesis. Moreover, the relative contribution (i.e.,
relative importance) of O, D, and S to proportionate their
contribution in FRPN ranking is assigned by resorting to expert
opinions. All these data are required to build fuzzy inference
system (FIS), i.e. well-defined rule base consisting of ife-
thenrules for FRPN calculations
 fuzzy if-then inference system is evaluated by using “min-max
inferencing”method [25] to process fuzzy inputs and to produce
a fuzzy output;
 defuzzification process based on centre of gravity (COG)method
is used to evaluate a FRPN crisp value.
Linguistic terms of risk factors O, D, S and FRPN are shown in
Tab.s (1) through (4) [11].
Weights of linguistic variables related to O, S, D, and FRPN are
evaluated by assuming linear hypothesis as follows:
WO, WD, WS, WFRPN ¼ i/k i ¼ 1, 2, …, k (2)
where k is the number of language variables that define O, D, S and
FRPN.
Relative importance RO, RD, RS of risk factors O, D, and S (see
Table 5) are given by the analyst that defines values, non-negative
and sum of 1, based on the needs of the safety analysis.
However, linear hypothesis of weights for linguistic labels
describing risk factor scales not always can apply. In the case in
point here, component failures can result in environmental radio-
active contaminations with consequences that can lead to a
growing range of severity scale, moreover component irradiation
effects can modify their performances and, consequently, affect
relationships between score ranking and failure occurrence prob-
ability. In addition, detection scoring, based on probabilistic infor-
mation, describes the ability of the process to identify potential
failures by means of inspection, periodic testing or the like, use of
suitable measurement and detection instruments with or without
real-time feedback, etc. However, irradiation conditions or use of
one-of-a-kind devices can change or limit detection methods’
effectiveness and so it could be necessary to modify association
between detection scores and detection probability information.
Moreover, equal importance among O, D and S could lead to
inaccurate risk ranking of final failure modes. As is well known,
component reliability data reported in literature does not take into
account the increase in failure rates due to the aging/failure ac-
celeration during irradiation processes. In this case, it is reasonable
that the impact of risk factor O in FRPN calculations should be more
Table 1
Linguistic terms of risk factor, O, and related weights WO.
Occurrence, Linguistic classification WO, weight by [11] WO, weight by expert opinion
Very Low, VL 0.20 0.414
Low, L 0.40 0.503
Medium, M 0.60 0.679
High, H 0.80 0.910
Very High, H 1.00 1.000
Table 2
Linguistic terms of risk factor, D, and related weights WD.
Detection, Linguistic classification WD, weight by [11] WD, weight by expert opinion
Non Detection, ND 1.00 1.000
Very Remote, VR 0.83 0.970
Remote, R 0.67 0.722
Moderate, M 0.50 0.650
High, H 0.33 0.217
High, VH 0.17 0.175
Table 3
Linguistic terms of risk factor, S, and related weights WS.
Severity, Linguistic classification WS, weight by [11] WS, weight by expert opinion
No Effect, N 0.10 0.289
Very Minor, VM 0.20 0.324
Minor, MR 0.30 0.397
Very Low, VL 0.40 0.431
Low, L 0.50 0.494
Moderate, M 0.60 0.621
High, H 0.70 0.782
Very High, VH 0.80 0.910
Hazardous With Warning, HWW 0.90 0.965
Hazardous Without Warning, HWOW 1.00 1.000
Table 4
Linguistic terms of FRPN and related weights WFRPN.
FRPN, Linguistic classification WFRPN, weight by [11] WFRPN, weight by expert opinion
Unnecessary, U 0.10 0.316
Minor, MI 0.20 0.322
Very Low, VL 0.30 0.479
Low, L 0.40 0.485
Moderate, M 0.50 0.648
High, H 0.60 0.658
Very High, VH 0.70 0.821
Extremely High, EH 0.80 0.837
Necessary, N 0.90 0.995
Absolutely Necessary, AN 1.00 1.000
Table 5
Weights of relative importance RO, RD, RS for component failure and fault due to human factor.
relative importance weight by [11] weight by expert opinion for component failure weight by expert opinion for human error
RO 0.30 0.335 0.461
RD 0.30 0.255 0.163
RS 0.40 0.410 0.376
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value to attribute to importance of risk factor O for determining
FRPN?
It follows that is essential to have different expert opinions, i.e.:
resort to expert judgment elicitation to a large degree; aggregate
their multiple point of views; reduce objectively the uncertainties
associated with their estimates.
To give an answer to above issues in a more focused and1466effective manner, it is proposed to improve FRPN by resorting to
evidence theory in construction of weights for linguistic distribu-
tions of O, S and D and in assignment of relative importance among
these parameters. This is performed both for component failures
and human error.
The aim is to take into account the interpretations by experts of
data related to risk assessments in failure modes of component/
human factor, and at the same time to carry out a new strategy to
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[13e16].2.1. Preliminaries of the evidence theory
Evidence theory, referred also as Dempster-Shafer theory (DST),
is an approach devoted to the representation of an uncertain
environment which entails assigning a “lower probability” [26] or a
“degree of belief” [27] to every event, or proposition. The notion of
belief degrees, or belief functions of subsets of a frame of discern-
ment, aims to present evidence theory as an extension of proba-
bility theory [28].
In this theory, each evidence of the “evidence system” contains
different potential decisions, called “focal elements”, and the
probability that the “focal element” is a good decision is denoted as
Basic Probability Assignment (BPA), known also as belief mass.
Let us consider U a frame of discernment, or a set of possible
answers to some questions (e.g. Very Low is the chance to detect a
potential failure mode), and Ai a subset of U (i.e. Ai is a set of focal
elements of the evidence containing a number of n mutually
exclusive and exhaustive propositions).
Belief mass functions maps m from 2U to interval [0,1] are
defined by:




To solve the problem more than one in information measure-
ment, and consequently to handle uncertainty, Shannon proposed
the concept of “information entropy” (i.e. entropy as a measure of
the disorder, in an analogous way to thermodynamic entropy) [27].
Shannon entropy, Es, can be used to calculate the uncertainty of





An extension of Shannon entropy is Deng entropy [30], that uses











where |Ai| is the cardinality of the set Ai.
Note that, Deng entropy, Ed;of Eq. (5) degenerates into Shannon
entropy, Es, of Eq. (4) when the cardinality of Ai is equal to 1.
Deng relative entropy [31,32] allows to measure the different
degree among more BPA, and, between two belief mass functions










By using Shannon entropy, Lin in Ref. [33] proposed the belief
JenseneShannon (BJS) divergence to measure the different be-


















where Dd is evaluated by Eq. (6).




















Notice that when BPA assignments tend to zero, Eq. (8) cannot
be calculated. Consequently, it is assumedm1ðAiÞ ¼m2ðAiÞ ¼ 1012
when this condition occurs [34,37]. This doesn’t affect the results as
shown in Ref. [37].
To improve advantages of belief divergence to measure differ-
ences among data from multi-sources and belief entropy to quan-
tify the system information volume, Wang and Xiao in Ref. [35]
proposed to integrate the credibility and the information volume to
allocate the weight on the original evidence. The new combination
rule allows merging knowledge from different sources as coherent
evidence and to resolve conflicts among sources. The authors
highlight that, if an evidence is highly similar to the average BPA, it
means that the evidence is more reliable because supported by
most of the other evidences, so it has high credibility.
Consequently, according Eq. (8), BJS is evaluated between each























where m is the number of mass functions for each evidence.
Similarities of evidences are negatively correlated with their
divergences, so if the divergence between two evidences is higher,
they have lower similarity. On the basis of this, the divergence





¼ eBJSðmj; mavÞ (10)
Credibility weight, wCR, is determined by normalizing the











Information volume of mass function mj is evaluated as follows
[34]:
IVj ¼ eEdj (12)
where Edj is the belief entropy of Ai, calculated by Eq. (5).





Based on credibility and information volume weight of evi-
dence, the new weight is adjusted and normalized, next modified
















Finally, for decision making, the pignistic probability transform
has been shown to be a good method of using BPA to make de-
cisions [38,39].
It converts each belief function into a pignistic probability dis-







In this paper, to construct a decision rule for predicting the
system of weights for linguistic variables and assignment of relative
importance in FRPN calculation, Eq. (17) is used.
2.2. Evidence theory application in FRPN
Eq.s (9) through (17) are proposed as rules to be used to treat
elicited knowledge from experts in FRPN application.
A flowchart of the proposed approach is reported in Fig. (1). The
method consists of the following main steps.
The expert-opinion process necessitates identifying and
recruiting qualified experts, soliciting their opinions in a structured
and efficient manner, retrieving a best estimate, and, perhaps most
importantly, quantifying the uncertainties associated with such an
estimate.
Elicitation procedure is done with one expert at a time, so that
an expert’s judgment would not be adversely influenced by other
experts.
As suggested in Ref. [16], an advisor-expert is involved to sup-
port the selection of experts and elicitation questions.
Ad hoc questionnaire was assigned to each expert and, in order
to evaluate its experience in the field in question, experts were
asked to answer questions regarding some major system-level
failure causes (e.g. faults of critical component in acceleration
systems; question about radiological risk; potential origins and
development of certain kinds of errors and failures in design and
use).
Five subject matter experts were selected to perform the anal-
ysis described in this paper.
All selected experts were asked to quantitatively state their
opinions on weights of linguistic variables, or their combinations,
for O, S, D, and FRPN and assignment of relative importance RO, RD,
and RS, in accordance with conditions Eq. (3).
Note that the application of relative importance of risk factors in
RPN and FRPN calculation procedures has been limited to failure
modes of components [9,40e42], neglecting the importance to
address also human factors as a key factor in the development of
mitigating strategies towards a significant reduction of accidental
events.
To overcome this shortcoming, the proposed approach has
included relative importance RO, RD, and RS connected to human
roles in risk assessment.
Tab.s (6) through (11) report belief systems defined by using the
above described elicitation process.
In particular, Tab.s (6) through (9) report BPA distributions
related to linguistic variables for O, D, S and FRPN. Tables (10) and
(11) show BPA distributions of relative importance RO, RD, and RS
for technical failure and human factor, respectively.
It is important to underline that BPA scoring results for
component failures by experts, reported in Table (10), show a ten-
dency to enhance the belief system construction especially on risk
factors O and S, while for human error, reported in Table (11), this1468direction is taken to emphasize the risk factor O.
In the subsequent step, credibility degree and information vol-
ume are combined, as described in section 2.1.
Finally, belief functions are converted into pignistic proba-
bility distributions to get the final decision about weights for
linguistic variables of O, S, D, and FRPN and relative importance
RO, RD, and RS. Tables (1) and (4) report weights obtained for
language variables of O, S, D, and FRPN. In these tables, data used
in Ref. [11] and obtained by Eq. (2), are also shown. Table (5)
reports results of relative importance RO, RD, and RS for tech-
nical failures and human faults. Fig.s (2) through 6 show these
results in graphical form.
Note that, RO, RD, and RS is calculated by using Eq. (17),
whereas weights for O, S, D, and FRPN are evaluated in terms of
BetP that is normalized respect the maximum value to obtain
results in the interval [0,1], as requested by FIS system for FRPN
evaluations [11].
Analyzing results shown in Fig.s (2) and (5), linguistic terms of
risk factors O and FRPN have weights higher than linear trend.
Similar results are achieved for S linguistic distributions reported in
Fig. (4), except for linguistic terms Very Low (VL), Low (L), and
Moderate (M) that are close to the linear hypothesis.
It is worth noting that for risk factors O, S, and FRPN, with
linguistic variable characterized by meaning of low-impact,
weights are about double (e.g., see occurrence O with linguistic
attribution “Very Low” of Fig. 2, WO ¼ 0.414 obtained by expert
judgment compared to WO ¼ 0.2), or more than double in case of
S.
This derives from the fact that, for the definition of BPA in belief
systems, more experts, among those interviewed, have preferred to
attribute importance also to linguistic categorizations considered of
low level, pointing out some aspects such as lack of shared tech-
nical knowledge in innovative aspects of the facility under
consideration, and "low-risk" isn’t "no-risk", especially in nuclear
field.
These results are consistent with assessments of relative
importance RO, RD, and RS reported in Fig. (6) (see also Table 5). In
fact, the proposed approach leads to values of relative importance
that stress risk factor S. For human errors, there is a tendency to
emphasize also risk factor O.
Human errors in innovative and advanced systems are difficult
to predict because such systems are often characterized by high
volume of information, criticality of decisions and actions, and
complexity of interactions [43e52]. So it is to be expected a special
attention by experts about problems related to human error
occurrence probability.
To help the reader to understand the procedure of calculations
described in section 2.1, a numerical example relevant to RO, RD, RS
calculation for technical failure are described in detail below.
The belief structure used for calculations is reported in
Table (10).
Step 1: arithmetical average of BPA is calculated for each belief




mav[(RO, RD)] ¼ 0.080
mav[(RO, RS)] ¼ 0.160
mav[(RD, RS)] ¼ 0.10
Step 2: BJS divergence measure between mj and ma is evaluated
according to Eq. (9). Then, similarity degree of each evidence by Eq.
(10) and weight of credibility by Eq. (11) are evaluated,
respectively:
Fig. 1. Flow chart for the calculation process of weights for linguistic variables of O, D, S, and FRPN and for assignment of relative importance RO, RD, and RS.
BJS(m1,mav) ¼ 0.009; Sim(m1,mav) ¼ 0.991; wCR1 ¼ 0.227
BJS(m2,mav) ¼ 0.262; Sim(m2.mav) ¼ 0.770; wCR2 ¼ 0.176
BJS(m3,mav) ¼ 0.203; Sim(m3,mav) ¼ 0.817; wCR3 ¼ 0.187
BJS(m4,mav) ¼ 0.198; Sim(m4,mav) ¼ 0.820; wCR4 ¼ 0.188
BJS(m5,mav) ¼ 0.026; Sim(m5,mav) ¼ 0.974; wCR5 ¼ 0.223 w1 ¼ 0.063; w1* ¼ 0.305
w2 ¼ 0.051; w2* ¼ 0.245
w3 ¼ 0.011; w3* ¼ 0.052
w4 ¼ 0.010; w4* ¼ 0.047
w5 ¼ 0.072; w5* ¼ 0.351
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calculated by using Eq. s (5), (12), (13), respectively. Note that n in
Eq. (5) corresponds to the number of elements in set Ai, this is 6.Ed1 ¼ 3.16; IV1 ¼ 23.47; wIVi ¼ 0.278
Ed2 ¼ 3.19; IV2 ¼ 24.29; wIV2 ¼ 0.287
Ed3 ¼ 1.58; IV3 ¼ 4.88; wIV3 ¼ 0.058
Ed4 ¼ 1.49; IV4 ¼ 4.42; wIV4 ¼ 0.052




m*(RO, RD) ¼ 0.115
m*(RO, RS) ¼ 0.229
m*(RD, RS) ¼ 0.150
Step 6: Pignistic transformation to represent the crisp value of


















BPAs of belief system related to risk factor occurrence, O, obtained by resorting to
expert judgment.
Belief mass Evidence system for occurrence, O
(VL) (L) (M) (H) (VH) (VL, L, M) (H, VH)
m1(expert1) 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.10
m2(expert2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.70
m3(expert3) 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.40 0.00 0.00
m4(expert4) 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.00 0.00
m5(expert5) 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.00
Table 7
BPAs of belief system related to risk factor detection, D, obtained by resorting to
expert judgment.
Belief mass Evidence system for detection, D
(ND) (VR) (R) (M) (H) (VH) (ND, VR) (R, M) (H, VH)
m1(expert1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.30 0.20
m2(expert2) 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
m3(expert3) 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
m4(expert4) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00
m5(expert5) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.40 0.10
Table 10
BPAs of belief system related to relative importance RO, RD, RS for component failure,
obtained by resorting to expert judgment.
Belief mass Evidence system for relative importance parameters, technical
failures
(Ro) (Rd) (Rs) (Ro, Rd) (Ro, Rs) (Rd, Rs)
m1(expert1) 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.10
m2(expert2) 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.20
m3(expert3) 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00
m4(expert4) 0.30 0.20 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
m5(expert5) 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.20
Table 11
BPAs of belief system related to relative importance RO, RD, RS for failures due to
human factor, obtained by resorting to expert judgment.
Belief mass Evidence system for relative importance parameters, failure
due to human factor
(Ro) (Rd) (Rs) (Ro, Rd) (Ro, Rs) (Rd, Rs)
m1(expert1) 0.50 0.10 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
m2(expert2) 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.20
m3(expert3) 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00
m4(expert4) 0.50 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.10 0.10
m5(expert5) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50





RD ¼ BetP(RD) ¼ 0.255
RS ¼ BetP (RS) ¼ 0.4103. HA-GRS risk analysis and results
3.1. Fuzzy rule-based approach to evaluate a new FRPN
Let A be a collection of numbers or objects (fuzzy set), called the
universe of discourse, whose elements are denoted by x; a fuzzy
subset A in x is characterised by a membership function fA(x) that
associates each element x with a real number in the interval [0, 1].
The function fA(x) represents the degree of membership of x in the
fuzzy set A [25].
Degree of membership of variable x in fuzzy set A can be
described by using the following relationships for triangular and
trapezoidal distributions:le 8
s of belief system related to risk factor severity, S, obtained by resorting to expert ju
elief mass Evidence system for severity, S
(N) (VMR) (MR) (VL) (L) (M) (H) (VH) (HW
1(expert1) 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
2(expert2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3(expert3) 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
4(expert4) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.20
5(expert5) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.20
le 9
s of belief system related to FRPN obtained by resorting to expert judgment.
elief mass Evidence system for risk priority number, FRPN
(U) (MI) (VL) (L) (M) (H) (VH) (EH
1(expert1) 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.1
2(expert2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
3(expert3) 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.1
4(expert4) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0





b a a  x  b
x c






b a a  x  b
1 b< x  c
x d
c d c< x  d
0 otherwise
(18)
For brevity, triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers are often
denoted as f(a;b;c) and f(a;b;c;d).
Using triangular and trapezoidal functions as linguistic data,
inputs of risk factors O, S and D are break-down into fuzzy functions
of Tab.s (12) through (14) and output FRPN into fuzzy sets reported
in Table (15). These fuzzy linguistic functions are therefore used indgment.
W) (HWOW) (N, VMR) (MR,VL) (L, M) (H, VH) (HWW, HWOW)
0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.12
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.30
0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.20 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
) (N) (AN) (U, MI) (VL, L) (M, H) (VH, EH) (N, AN)
5 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.25 0.35
0 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50
0 0.20 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fig. 2. Weights of language distributions for occurrence, O, obtained by expert judgment.
Fig. 3. Weights of language distributions for detection, D, obtained by expert judgment.
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Fuzzy ifethen-based rules of FIS system are determined taking
into account relative importance of the input O, S and D and
weights of their linguistic terms [11].
In particular, by using weights WO, WD, WS and WFRPN and
relative importance RO, RD, RS reported in Tab.s (1) through (5),
obtained by using expert opinion as reported in section 2.2, FIS
system is built as described below.
Weight WFRPN is evaluated by using the following relationship,
as suggested in Ref. [11]:
WFRPN ¼ RO WO þ RD WD þ RS WS (19)1471WFRPN value by using Eq. (19) allows for the identification of
linguistic term of FRPN output as explained in the following
example for component failure with RO ¼ 0.335, RD ¼ 0.255, RS ¼
0.41(see Table 5):
Rule / If O is H with weight WO ¼ 0.910 and
D is R with weight WD ¼ 0.722 and
S is M with weight WS ¼ 0.621 then
FRPN is VH with weight WFRPN ¼ 0.821
Detailing contents of this rule, mathematically it happens that
Fig. 4. Weights of language distributions for severity, S, obtained by expert judgment.
Fig. 5. Weights of language distributions for risk priority number, FRPN, obtained by expert judgment.
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þ 0.225  0.722 þ 0.41  0.621 ¼ 0.744. This value is close to risk
defined as Very High (VH) (Table 4) with WFRPN ¼ 0.821.
A number of 300 rule combinations (5O  6D  10S, being 5, 6,
10 number of linguistic terms of O, D, and S, respectively) has been
built and used in the analysis.
To evaluate FRPN crisp value, fuzzy inference process flows
through these fuzzy ifethen rules, where minemax method for the
aggregation of outputs is used [11,25], and then proceeds with the
defuzzification procedure by using COG method, as described in
Ref. [11].
Note that in the study reported in this paper, HEART approach1472proposed in Ref. [43] was used to evaluate error probability
necessary to define O factor for failures related to human factor.3.2. HA-GRS description
A detailed description about SPES safety and control systems
can be found in Ref. [3,5].
The target-ion source system is irradiated by proton for
approximately fifteen days. The proton driver is a Cyclotron with
variable energy (15e70 MeV) and a maximum current of 0.750 mA
upgradeable to 1.5 mA and split on two exit ports.
High vacuum condition (106 mbar) is provided by a complex
Fig. 6. Values of relative importance RO, RD, and RS, obtained by expert judgment.
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roots pumps. The root pumps provide a fore vacuum condition
(102 mbar) for beams channel and discharge of the turbo-
molecular pumps. When the beam is switched off no more high
vacuum condition is requested and venting operation restore at-
mospheric pressure into the front-end part of the vacuum line.
It is mandatory that HA-GRS line stays always under ambient
pressure, not only during beam operations, but also later time to
avoid possible leaks to the working environment.
HA-GRS can be divided in three main subsystems:
- vacuum pipeline system, that connects turbo-molecular and
root pumps with the storage system;
- storage system, where three storage tanks are used to store
safely gases coming from vacuum system
- discharge system used to discharge exhaust gases in atmo-
sphere through a chimney, if radiological safety requirements
are reached.
Fig. 7 shows early design of HA-GRS system studied in this
paper.
The gas flows through an oil condenser (C1 in Fig. 7), used to
remove oil impurity produced by rotary vane pumps, C1 is con-
nected in series with expansion vessel, VA, characterized by double
wall tanks.
VA pressure cannot fall below a threshold value (about
500 mbar) to cover the specific vacuum pumps operational con-
ditions. Below this limit, the rotary pumps are damaged due to
lubricating oil losses. A higher pressure set point is also ensured,Table 12
Fuzzy FMECA scale for occurrence, O, of component failure and human error [11].
Linguistic scale Component failure, probability per operating day Human error occur
Very Low (VL) <1/20,000 Less than every
5 years
Low (L) 1/20,000 ÷ 1/2,000 Every 2 ÷ 5 years, o
Moderate (M) 1/2,000 ÷ 1/200 Several times a yea
times a month
High (H) 1/200 ÷ 1/20 Once a week, sever
Very High (VH) 1/20 ÷ 1/2 Once a day, severa
1473with a value lower than atmospheric pressure.
If VA pressure exceeds 500 mbar, an automated back pressure
regulator becomes operational. Its operation is based on pressure
measurements of PSI_VA transducer that allows V2_VA valve
opening and closing by using a stepper motor device, PSE_VA
pressure transducer is provided to control the pressure in the gap of
the VA tanks. assuring to monitor if breaking event in VA inner wall
occurs.
HEPA (High Efficiency Particulate Air filter) allows to purify gas
before storage in vessel S1.
S1 and S2 allow to storage gas by using the following opera-
tional conditions: if S1 is filled up to the maximum pressure of
800 mbar, valve V1_S1 is closed and valve V1_S2 is opened to fill S2
storage vessel, S3 is used as safety tank, if overfilling of S1 and S2
occurs.
To improve safety, storage vessels, S1, S2 and S3 are character-
ized by steel double wall tanks in which the pressure is lower than
atmospheric pressure.
The filling process is streamlined by using a Programmable Logic
Controller (PLC) that closes and opens valves based on measure-
ments of pressure gauges PSI_S1, PSI_S2 and PSI_S3, positioned in
vessels S1, S2 and S3, respectively.
Pressure gauges PSE_S1, PSE_S2 and PSE_S3 measure the pres-
sure between the inner and outer walls of the storage vessels to
control if break inner wall condition occurs.
Storage vessels can be isolated by manual valves located at inlet
and outlet of each storage vessel (VM1_S1, VM2_S1, VM1_S2,
VM2_S2, VM1_S3, VM2_S3 in Fig. 7) to carry out maintenance
procedures.rence probability Risk fuzzy membership function, f(a; b;c) or f(a; b;c; d)
(0; 0; 1; 3)
nce a year (1; 3; 5)
r, once a month, several (3; 5; 7)
al times a week (5; 7; 9)
l times a day (7; 9; 10; 10)
Table 13
Fuzzy FMECA scale for detection, D [11].
Likelihood of failure detection failure detection probability Risk fuzzy membership function f(a; b;c) or f(a; b;c; d)
Very High (VH). Design control almost certainly detects the failure. 0.00 ÷ 0.15 (0; 0; 2; 3.5)
High (H). High chance that the design control almost certainly detects the failure. 0.15 ÷ 0.35 (2; 3; 4; 5.5)
Moderate (M). Failure remains undetected until the system performance is affected. 0.35 ÷ 0.65 (3.5; 5; 6; 7.5)
Remote (R). Failure remains undetected until an inspection is carried out. 0.65 ÷ 0.85 (5.5; 7; 8; 9)
Very Remote (VR). Design control cannot detect potential cause. 0.85 ÷ 0.90 (7.5; 9; 10)
Non detection (ND). There is no design verification. 0.90 ÷ 1.00 (9; 10; 10)
Table 14
Fuzzy FMECA scale for severity, S [11].
Effects Risk fuzzy membership function f(a; b;c) or f(a;
b;c; d)
No effect (N). (0; 0; 1; 2)
Very Minor (VMR). Very minor effect on system. No injury to people. (1; 2; 3)
Minor (MR). Minor effect on system. Very minor or no injury to people. (2; 3; 4)
Very Low (VL). Very low effect on system. Minor or no injury to people. (3; 4; 5)
Low (L). Low effect and system requires repair. Low danger for people. (4; 5; 6)
Moderate (M). System is degraded. Moderate danger to people (5; 6; 7)
High (H). System is severely affected but functions. Major injury to people. (6; 7; 8)
Very High (VH). System losses primary function. Failure can involve hazardous outcomes. Major injury to people. (7; 8; 9)
Hazardous with warning (HWW). Failure involves hazardous outcomes. Very dangerous condition or death of people. (8; 9; 10)




FMECA scale for FRPN.
Linguistic Value of the FRPN Risk fuzzy membership function f(a; b;c) or f(a;
b;c; d)
Almost unnecessary to take measures (U). (0; 0; 25; 75)
Minor priority to take measures (MI). (25; 75; 125)
Very Low priority to take measures(VL). (75; 125; 175)
Low priority to take measures (L). (125; 200.300)
Moderate priority to take measures (M). (200; 300; 400)
High priority to take measures (H). (300; 400; 500)
Very high Very High priority to take measures (VH). (400; 550; 700)
Extremely High priority to take measures (EH). (500; 650; 800)
Necessary to take < hyperlink refid ¼ "https://context.reverso.net/traduzione/inglese-italiano/take þ measures">
measures (N).
(700; 800; 900)
Absolute Necessary to take measures (AN). (800; 900; 1000; 1000)
P. Buffa, M. Giardina, G. Prete et al. Nuclear Engineering and Technology 53 (2021) 1464e1478Electro-pneumatic valves V2_S1, V2_S2 e V2_S3, at the exit of
storage vessels, allow to isolate HA-GRS from the chimney during
the experimental tests, and perform gas discharge operations when
radiological safety conditions are achieved.
Discharge process is performed by using extraction piston pump
X-DRY of Fig. 7, following the opening of valves V2_S1, V2_S2 e
V2_S3 and valve V_ROT, located downstream of X-DRY.
Before gas releasing from the chimney, a gas sample is analysed
to determine if radiological safety requirements are ensured. The
operator gives the authorization to exhaust gas release on the basis
of measurement results.3.3. Results and discussion
Collection of component failure rate data is one of the main
tasks needed to perform FMECA analysis.
A large part of information (operational conditions, materials,
construction features, element functions of components, etc.)
comes by companies which are manufacturers of devices used in
"vacuum technology".
Some reliability data result from a review of literature reported1474in Ref. [53e57].
The analysis involved compilation of more than one hundred
FMECA forms by using Risk Analysis Database (RAD) software [58].
This activity has allowed to create a failure modes taxonomy
which can be useful in further safety analysis performed, for
example, by using fault tree analysis (FTA) or in risk assessments of
other accelerator systems.
Two main operating steps were taken into account to compile
FMECA worksheets:
 storage operation during experimental test;
 exhaust gases discharge operation.
Maintenance procedures were also examined to identify
possible HA-GRSmalfunctions due to human factor. For example, in
the isolation procedure of parts of system for carrying out
replacement of components, failure to open (or to close) of manual
valves, caused by carelessness or oversight, can negatively affect
performance of both safety and control systems.
Traditional RPN application and FRPN obtained by fuzzy pro-
cedure reported in Ref. [11] are also evaluated for comparison and
Fig. 7. HA-GRS layout. Design changes, suggested on the basis of fuzzy FMECA results, are reported in red.
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250 are reported in Tables 16 and 17 for storage operational con-
ditions, and Table 18 for discharge operation. Note that in these
tables results obtained by using the proposed method are indicated
with FRPN*.
As expected, comparison among results highlights that tradi-
tional RPN scoring is different from one obtained by FRPN and
FRPN*.
For example, during storage operations, failure modes of PSI_VA
(measurements errors, less than) and HEPA (rupture, gas leakage)
show same RPN value (RPN ¼ 120 in Table 16). However, HEPA
failure leads to releases in environment of radioactive gas with very
high severity, i.e. S¼ 8. This issue is highlighted by FRPN and FRPN*
that result in FRPN ¼ 393.1 and FRPN* ¼ 379.5, respectively (about
3 times compared to RPN value).
In like manner, failure modes of C1 (oil external leakage) and
HEPA (gas external leakage) show same RPN value of 160 in
Table 16. These failures are classified with same severity S ¼ 8 but a
bit of difference among parameters O and D. Alternatively, FRPN
and FRPN* provide high scorings, pointing out prioritization of C1
failure characterized by highest risk factor O.
FRPN and FRPN* rank as a critical failure event the measure-
ment error (DP overestimation) of pressure gauge PSI_VA
(FRPN ¼ 513.1 and FRPN* ¼ 500.1 in Table 16), the consequences ofTable 16
FMECA results of component failures that are critical for the safety of storage operations
Component Failure mode Main effects
PSI_VA Measurement error (more than) Oil leakage from fore vacuum pu
Measurement error (less than) Anomalous storage interruption
C1 External leakage Oil leakage
HEPA External leakage Gas leakage
Rupture Gas leakage
1475which can result both in stopping storage operation and damages of
the vacuum system (oil leakage from the root pumps).
On the whole of failure modes of Table (16), FRPN* values are
lower than FRPN ones. However, it should be underlined that
FRPN* retains same ranking order of failure modes obtained by
FRPN, but the risk prioritization is based on a more noticeable scale
(e.g. in Table 16, FRPN* ¼ 459.8 and FRPN* ¼ 430.8 related to two
different failures with same RPN ¼ 160 compared to FRPN ¼ 461.0
and FRPN ¼ 458.9 that define a close ranking of these failures).
Critical failures are obtained for a set of valves located in vacuum
pipeline system and inlet of storage system (Table 17).
In particular, failure mode with gas external leakage in V1_VA
and V1_S1 valves is characterized by very remote detection and
very dangerous conditions for people and operator. For this failure,
defined by a triplet of risk factors (O; D;S)¼(5; 8;8), FRPN* provides
a scoring higher than FRPN one (FRPN* ¼ 583.6 compared to
FRPN ¼ 555.1). This result can be attribute to new FIS system that
seems to highlight circumstance under which two out of three
evaluation criteria are characterized by very high value, i.e. D ¼ 8
and S ¼ 8.
For failure modes of V1_VA valve with triplet of risk factors (O;
D;S)¼(6; 3;6) and (4; 5;6), we note that FRPN* gives a scoring for
(6; 3;6) that is higher than one obtained for (4; 5;6) (i.e.
FRPN* ¼ 306.3 compared to FRPN* ¼ 295.5). This result shows that.
O D S RPN FRPN [11] FRPN*
mps (DP overestimation) 5 7 7 245 513.1 500.1
due to DP underestimation 5 4 6 120 386.6 351.0
5 4 8 160 461.0 459.8
4 5 8 160 458.9 430.8
3 5 8 120 393.1 379.5
Table 17
FMECA results of valve failures that are critical for the safety of storage operations.
Component Failure mode Main effects O D S RPN FRPN
[11]
FRPN*
V1_VA External leakage Pressure increases into the storage vessel (S1 or S2) and probable gas leakage 5 8 8 320 555.1 583.6
Spurious closing Storage interruption 6 3 6 108 327.8 306.3
Opening failure on demand Storage interruption 4 5 6 120 352.2 295.5
VM1_VA Valve is closed, human error in valve
maintenance
5 5 7 175 434.8 444.6
V2_VA External leakage Pressure increases into the storage vessel (S1 or S2) and probable gas leakage 5 4 8 160 461.0 459.8
Spurious closing Storage interruption 6 3 6 108 327.8 306.3
Opening failure on demand Storage interruption 4 5 6 120 352.2 295.5
V1_S1 External leakage Pressure increases into the storage vessel S1 and probable gas leakage 5 8 8 320 555.1 583.6
Spurious closing Storage interruption 6 4 6 144 438.4 403.0




Valve is closed, human error in valve
maintenance
pressure increases in storage line 4 5 7 140 378.7 410.7
Table 18
FMECA results of component failures that are critical for the safety of discharge operations.
Component Failure mode Main effects O D S RPN FRPN [11] FRPN*
V_ROT External leakage Gas leakage 5 5 8 200 470,4 483.9
Spurious closing Gas discharge interruption 6 5 4 120 305,5 278.5
X-DRY Breaking Gas leakage 5 2 9 90 410,7 426.4
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consider the impact of parameter O in FRPN* calculation more
important than parameter D. Note that opposite result is obtained
by using FRPN.
Moreover, human roles are critical for failure modes of valves
VM1_S1, VM1_S2, VM1_S3 that result to be closed due to human
error in maintenance procedure. Tre triplet of risk factors (O;
D;S)¼(4; 5;7) leads to FRPN* higher than the one obtained by FRPN
(see Table 17, FRPN* ¼ 410.7 compared to FRPN ¼ 378.7). In this
case, the result is influenced by two main factors:
 weights of linguistic terms for risk factor, O, used to define the
new FIS system, are higher than those reported in Ref. [11],
especially for linguistic attributions VL and L (see Fig. 2) that
define risk factor, O, lower than 5 (Table 12);
 relative importance distribution of risk factors O, D, and S, re-
ported in Table 5 emphasizes the importance of O in case of
human errors.
During discharge operations, critical events are related to
external leakage of valve V_ROT and extraction pump X_DRY
(Table 18).
For valve V_ROT with failure causing gas external leakage
characterized by S ¼ 8, traditional RPN provides a low value of 200
compared to results obtained by FRPN and FRPN* that give
FRPN ¼ 470.4 and FRPN* ¼ 483.9. Note that FRPN* enhances the
visibility of this critical event.
Finally, for X_DRY failure mode concerning breaking with gas
external leakage, it should be noted that traditional RPN has a low
value of 90, despite this fault is characterized by very dangerous
conditions with S ¼ 9 (i.e. failure involves hazardous outcomes or
death of people can occur). FRPN and FRPN* highlight the criticality
of this event by giving FRPN ¼ 410.7 and FRPN* ¼ 426.4. This
outcome is better highlighted by FRPN* that provides a value
higher than FRPN one.
On the basis of the above results, design improvements, to in-
crease safety conditions and reduce consequences, are suggested as
follows:1476- add external containment in oil condenser C1 and in filter HEPA,
to mitigate consequences of oil or gas leakages;
- use a pressure gauges, upstream of VA and upstream of storage
systems (see PS1 and PS2 in Fig. 7) to improve redundancy of
pressure measurements in vacuum pipeline and at the inlet of
the storage vessels;
- add a pressure gauge immediately downstream of storage ves-
sels (PS3 in Fig. 7) to monitor possible leakage in discharged
pipeline during experimental tests;
- use valve lockouts to keep machine and equipment parts secure
during maintenance/repairs;
- use colored labels that enable to operators to understand
properly (no misunderstanding) if valves are open or close
correctly, on the basis of the required condition in the per-
formed maintenance procedure;
- add an electrically-actuated valve (see valve VS in Fig. 7) before
the extraction pump X_DRY to isolate storage system from
discharge line against occurrence of valve failures downstream
storage system.
4. Conclusion
The challenge of Selective Production of Exotic Species experi-
mental project is to build up aworld level facility for the production
of exotic beams for nuclear physics experiments. Very high vacuum
conditions are required together with a system to storage radio-
active exhaust gases safely. For such purposes, high activity gas
recovery system (HA-GRS) is designed to reduce radiological risk
for operators and people.
In this paper, fuzzy failure mode effect and criticality analysis
(FMECA) is used to support a preliminary risk assessment of the
HA-GRS system. This tool has been modified by using a new
method to evaluate the fuzzy risk priority number (FRPN).
FRPN, developed to overcome some deficiencies in conventional
risk priority number (RPN) applications highlighted in literature
[18e24], is a powerful method of ranking critical failures. It requires
to build fuzzy inference system (FIS), i.e. well-defined rule base
consisting of fuzzy ifethen rules for FRPN calculations [11]. For this
P. Buffa, M. Giardina, G. Prete et al. Nuclear Engineering and Technology 53 (2021) 1464e1478purpose, risk factors occurrence (O), detection (D), severity (S),
used as inputs, and FRPN, used as output, are classified into fuzzy
linguistic distributions and a weight is attributed to each linguistic
variable by using linear function [11]. Moreover, relative impor-
tance among O, D, and S is assigned.
However, there are several technical problems associated to
these tasks, i.e.:
 linear weight for linguistic variables of O, D, and S and RPN not
always can be applied;
 equal importance among O, D and S could lead to inaccurate risk
ranking of final failure modes;
 aggregate expert opinions on risks associated to failure modes
for components/human actions when safety aspects are mainly
related to extensive use of one-of-a-kind devices for which ex-
periences in failure modes and reliability data collections are
limited;
 aggregate multiple point of views from experts and dampen the
effects of variability associated with their estimates.
Another point of attention is that when we make recourse to
expert opinion, if measurements are replaced by observations and
linguistic descriptions, this type of uncertainty cannot be properly
handled by stochastic methods, but must be treated by the possi-
bility theory or other uncertainty theories [59].
Having taken into consideration the above-said, it is proposed to
use expert elicitation process to be incorporated in FRPN calcula-
tions and so to evaluate a new FRPN index, i.e. FRPN*. This is per-
formed by resorting to evidence theory, both for technical failures
and faults related to human factors.
The success of any expert elicitation process is highly dependent
upon how carefully the experts are chosen, whether the experts
provide unbiased judgments, and, finally, how multiple opinions
are reconciled or combined.
The proposed approach allows to take into account importance
of interpretations by experts of data related to risk assessments of
failure modes of component/human error, but at the same time to
consider the uncertainty that exists among alternative points of
view provided by experts [60,61].
Results of HA-GRS analysis by using traditional RPN, FRPN re-
ported in Ref. [11] and FRPN* as proposed in this paper are
compared.
As expected, comparison among results highlights that RPN
ranking is different from one obtained by using FRPN and FRPN*. In
particular, RPN scoring doesn’t highlight potential problems ac-
cording to the real criticality of failure modes and doesn’t allow to
clearly distinguish those items which should be improved.
This task is properly performed by FRPN* and FRPN, but some
differences.
FRPN* retains same ranking order of failure modes obtained by
FRPN, but the risk prioritization is based on amore noticeable scale,
e.g. in Table 16 FRPN* ¼ 459.8 and FRPN* ¼ 430.8 related to two
different failures with same RPN ¼ 160 compared to FRPN ¼ 461.0
and FRPN ¼ 458.9 that define a close ranking of these failures.
Moreover, FRPN* provides scorings higher than FRPN if two out
of three evaluation criteria are characterized by very high value
(e.g. D¼ 8 and S¼ 8 for failure mode of valve V1_VA of Table 17), or
in case of failures modes related to human errors the a higher
probability of happening.
Another difference between FRPN and FRPN* is that, for
example, for failure modes with triplet of risk factors (O; D;S)¼(6;
3;6) and (4; 5;6), FRPN* gives a prioritization to (6; 3;6)
(FRPN* ¼ 306.3 compared to FRPN* ¼ 295.5 of Table 17). Opposite
result is obtained by using FRPN. This result shows that the pro-
posed approach is coherent with the expert opinion that consider1477the impact of parameter O in risk priority number calculations
more important than parameter D.
Critical analysis of the results has allowed to provide recom-
mendations able to improve safety requirements for equipment
and procedures, reducing the occurrence of accidental conditions.
These suggestions will be used in revised design of the HA-GRS
system.
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